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namely  strategic  conflict  theory  and  socio-political  instability  models.  The  first  strand  can  be  traced  back  to 
Haavelmo (1954) and has been further developed in a variety of ways by game theoretical models of rational conflict 
(Boulding, 1962; Schelling, 1963, Hirshleifer, 2001). Their goal is to understand threat power. A second version of 
conflict theory has been developed by the founders of the Public Choice School (Olson 1965, 1982; Tullock 1974, 
1980; Stringham, 2005, 2007) in order to tackle genuine political violence.  
 
The main finding of this paper is that both strands of recent economic literature have not yet come to grips with 
social conflicts. The application of standard microeconomic assumptions to the field of “social conflicts” has resulted 
in reducing conflicts either to “rational conflicts”- a threat of conflict without any real clash - or “real self-interested 
private conflicts”. In other words, economic theory has considered social protesters either as looters or lunatics, but 
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Cet article fournit un survol critique de deux branches récentes de la vaste littérature économique portant sur les 
conflits sociaux, à savoir la théorie du conflit stratégique et les modèles d’instabilité sociopolitique. La première 
branche peut  être  retracée  à  Haavelmo  (1954),  et a été  formalisée depuis par de  nombreux  modèles du  conflit 
rationnel  s’inspirant  de  la  théorie  des  jeux  (Boulding,  1962;  Schelling,  1963,  Hirshleifer,  2001).  Leur  objectif 
consiste à comprendre le pouvoir de menace. Une seconde branche de la théorie des conflits a été développée par les 
fondateurs de l’école du choix public (Olson 1965, 1982; Tullock 1974, 1980; Stringham, 2005, 2007) qui essaie de 
traiter de la violence politique authentique.  
Notre survol critique démontre que l’application des postulats standards de la microéconomie dans le domaine des 
conflits sociaux conduit à réduire ces conflits soit en « conflits rationnels », c'est-à-dire en une menace de conflits 
sans aucune confrontation réelle, soit en « conflits réels pour les intérêts prives ». En d’autres termes, cette littérature 
décrit les contestataires sociaux comme des pilleurs ou des ignorants et irrationnels, mais jamais comme un groupe 
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Neoclassical  economic  theory  does  not  deny  conflictual  or  antagonistic  interests  caused  by 
scarcity.  But  as  Varoufakis  and  Young  (1990)  aptly  point  out,  this  general  opposition  or 
antagonism  must  be  distinguished  from  conflictual  activity  involving  the  use  of  resources 
(including time) to resolve competition between contending interests. In other words, antagonistic 
interests need not necessarily develop into open confrontation.  
 
The  critical  assumption  of  neoclassical  economics  postulates  that  conflicts  of  interest  in  the 
economy are resolved in contracts that are either voluntarily observed or are enforceable at no 
cost to the exchanging parties. Abba Lerner (1972, p. 259) described the role of conflict in the 
Walrasian  model  in  the  following  terms:  “With  or  without  a  fight,  there  is  a  settlement  or 
compromise  in  which  the  rights  are  defined.  Those  who  benefit  from  the  activity  gain  the 
approval  of  those  who  object by  giving  them  something  to  get  them  to  agree.  What  I  want 
particularly to stress is that the solution is essentially the transformation of the conflict from a 
political  problem  to  an  economic  transaction.  An  economic  transaction  is  a  solved  political 
problem.”  
 
Exchanges may be solved political problems where contracts are comprehensive and enforceable 
at no cost to the exchanging parties. By ‘solved political problem’, Lerner means the absence of 
power  relationships.  Contractual  incompleteness  provides  a  logical  foundation  for  conflictual 
activity: “Allowing for the possibility of conflict, which amounts to recognizing the possibility 
that property rights are not perfectly and costlessly enforced, represents a significant departure 
from the traditional paradigm of economics.” (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007, p. 650). 
 
According to Bowles and Gintis (1988, 1990), if some aspect of the object of exchange is too 
complex or difficult to monitor, to the degree that comprehensive contracts are not feasible or are 
feasible  only  by  a  third  party,  then  the  exchange  is  contested.  Contested  exchange  entails 
conflicts that cannot be resolved through voluntary contracts. In this case, we are confronted with 
social conflict. Social conflict entails unsolved political problems.  
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Social conflict is a struggle waged by a group of people for a common cause. There are two main 
characteristics  for  social  conflicts.  First,  unlike  market-type  conflicts,  which  are  carried  out 
within a voluntary exchange framework, social conflicts involve coercive power and domination. 
Second,  social  conflicts  assume  people  struggling  for  “common  interests”  and  not  only  for 
private individual interests (Vahabi, 2009b). As Lerner correctly reminds, the Walrasian model 
precludes such type of conflict.  
 
Despite the exclusion of social conflicts from the field of economics, economic theory accepted a 
particular type of conflict. Since any competitive activity implies a certain type of conflict of 
interest among agents, the neoclassical school has largely developed theories of conflict which 
may be called “system neutral” or “pro-systemic” (Gupta, 1990) according to which conflicts 
remain within the rules of the market economy. The competitive, oligopolistic and monopolistic 
strategies have been analysed by Cournot, Stackelberg, Edgeworth, Richardson, Von Neumann, 
Morgenstern,  and  others  (see  Schmidt,  1993)  on  the basis  of  some  fundamental behavioural 
assumptions such as rationality and  maximization. But  what  about other  types of  conflictual 
activities involving coercive power? 
 
Economic literature has identified  the utilitarian  dimension of coercive power as a means of 
appropriation since Pareto ([1927] 1971, p. 341): “The efforts of men are utilized in two different 
ways: they are directed to the production or transformation of economic goods, or else to the 
appropriation of goods produced by others”. Despite this early recognition of the appropriation 
theme, it occupied a marginal place in our discipline till recently.  
 
Treating appropriation as a basic form of economic activity requires a theoretical framework in 
which predatory activity could have a positive though decreasing marginal utility. Rational agents 
could be involved in such type of activity as long as it does not bear negative value. The goal is to 
explain appropriation according to rational conflict, which excludes real destruction. Rational 
conflict refers to threat power and can be defined as a bargaining procedure without any real 
clash  or  conflict  between  the  parties,  which  are  both  partners  and  adversaries.  Examples  of 
strategic  conflict  theory  include  negotiations  about  nuclear  power,  commercial  negotiations 
within  the  GATT  or  WTO,  and  negotiations  between  institutionalized  trade  unions  and 
employers’ organizations on wage and work conditions.  
 
Haavelmo (1954) pioneered a canonical general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources 
among appropriative and productive activities with no fictitious auctioneer. Over the last four 
decades,  the  model  has  been  interpreted  in  a  variety  of  ways  using  game  theory  models of 
rational  conflict  (Boulding,  1962;  Schelling,  1963)  within  a  partial  equilibrium  framework 
particularly  along  Cournot  (Hirshleifer,  1991a,b)  and  Stackelberg  equilibrium
2.  This body  of 
work  is coined  as  “strategic  conflict  theory”  by  Schelling  (1963). Their  common  theoretical 
contention is that  appropriative activities  are  rationally  influenced by  the opportunity  cost of 
                                                              
2 The appropriation issue has been introduced into modern economic literature in the areas of international conflict, 
alliances and revolution (Sandler and Hartley, 1995), crime (Becker, 1968), rent-seeking (Tullock, 1967) and the 
coercive  dimensions  of  the  state  (McGuire  and  Olson,  1996).  Another  strand  of  work  endeavours  to  integrate 
appropriation into the core of neoclassical microeconomics (Bush, 1972; Bush and Mayer, 1974; Buchanan, 1975; 
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foregone production “in the shadow of conflict” (Anderton, Anderton, and Carter, 1999). Is social 
conflict integrated in this type of modeling? 
 
The first section of the present paper will tackle this problem. Our critical review of various 
models of strategic conflict theory shows that they do not integrate social conflicts since they do 
not capture the logic of coercive power. They consider markets to be a ubiquitous and invariable 
form of economic organization, and implicitly assume that any economy can be translated into 
market terms. This line of thought makes it necessary to stretch the content of the concepts of 
“voluntary exchange” and “mutual gain from trade” to embrace “exchange of threats”
3. In this 
context, a robbery, for example, is defined as an “implicit contract” between the robbed and the 
robber:  the  latter  preserves  the  life  of  the  former  in  return  for  a  certain  amount  of  money. 
Similarly,  social  protestors  such  as  striking  employees  are  depicted  as  potential  looters  or 
lunatics.  
 
To put differently, strategic conflict models are built upon the extension of the Coasian theorem 
(1960) to coercive power. This explains why rational conflicts are neutral. Neutrality of conflicts 
connotes a lack of need for real clashing or conflictual action, so a redistribution of wealth or 
reallocation of resources may occur despite conflictual interests among agents (Vahabi, 2009b). 
In a sense, in standard economics, conflict is treated like money: it is neutral with regard to 
economic performance and disappears in equilibrium.  
 
A second version of conflict theory has been developed by the founders of the Public Choice 
School (Stringham, 2005, 2007), notably by Olson (1965, 1982) and Tullock (1974, 1980) in 
order to tackle genuine political violence. They have studied not only threat power but also real 
conflictual situations such as revolutions, wars, terrorist activities, etc. Their goal is to extend the 
standard microeconomic assumptions to other fields of social sciences such as politics. They thus 
endeavour to incorporate real conflicts in economic analysis and provide a theoretical framework 
for a New Political Economy (Vahabi, 2009a).  
 
Real conflicts are not neutral, and have a clear impact on economic performance, since they come 
within the scope of rent-seeking activities and involve not only deadweight losses but also pure 
destruction
4. New Political Economy has produced a vast literature on political and appropriative 
conflicts under the name of “socio-political instability models” (Drazen, 2000). Three types of 
modelling  of  socio-political  instability  can  be  distinguished,  namely  the  rational  expectation 
model  of  political  violence,  predation  models,  and  common  property  models.  The  last  two 
variants of political instability models have many commonalities and similarities with strategic 
conflict  models  notably  with  regard  to  the  use  of  game  theory  and  the  extension  of  Coase 
theorem (1960) to coercive power. Nonetheless,  they  belong to  a  different research program 
which gives the pride of place to real conflicts with a clearly political dimension. 
 
The second section of the paper will provide a critical review of this more recent version of 
socio-political instability models. We disentangle different shades and types of modelling within 
                                                              
3 Similarly, the market exchange relationship is extended to include all forms of social interactions, including ones 
based on explicit coercion such as slavery, feudalism, or predatory allocation of resources (North, 1977).  
 
4 While “deadweight losses” are analyzed in economics of conflict, pure destruction is often ignored. The primacy of 





































the nebulous field of New Political Economy and question whether social conflict is integrated in 
this line of thinking. Our contention is that although this literature integrates real conflicts into 
economic theory, it  does not grapple  social conflict. The reason resides in the fact that  real 
conflicts are theorised on the assumption of a strictly self-motivated private interest. From this 
perspective, social protestors are considered as actual looters, but not as people struggling for a 
common cause. In our critical assessment, the main shortcoming of this approach is the use of 
individual cost-benefit analysis that cannot capture the logic of “transformation of costs into 
benefits” (Hirschman, 1970) in social conflicts. 
  
In this paper, I will thus provide a critical overview of these two strands of recent economic 
literature on social conflicts
5. Section one will introduce strategic conflict theory and underline its 
limits.  Section  two  will be entirely  devoted  to different  variants of  socio-political  instability 
models. This strand of economic modelling will be compared with the strategic conflict models 
and its shortcomings will be highlighted. A short conclusion will follow. 
 
I. Strategic conflict theory 
 
From  a  methodological  point  of  view,  “strategic  conflict  theory”  is  based  upon  rationality 
assumption and maximizing behaviour of agents: “It is faithful to our definition of “strategy”: it 
takes conflict for granted, but also assumes common interest between the adversaries; it assumes 
a  “rational”  value-maximizing  mode  of  behaviour;  and  it  focuses  on  the  fact  that  each 
participant’s  “best”  choice  of  action  depends  on  what  he  expects  the  other  to  do,  and  that 
“strategic  behaviour”  is  concerned  with  influencing  another’s  choice  by  working  on  his 
expectation of how one’s own behaviour is related to his.” (Schelling, 1963, p. 15). The theory 
tries to capture the “threat” or “potential” versus actual destruction in case of a limited (but not 
total) war. This amounts to saying that the principal subject of the theory is “deterrence” and not 
real war or social conflicts questioning the whole social system.  
 
Deterrence was of course a favourite topic of the cold war during the sixties, but it was far from 
total war, civil war, or other destructive phenomena on a large scale. “(T)hough “strategy of 
conflict”  sounds  cold-blooded,  the  theory  is  not  concerned  with  the  efficient  application  of 
violence or anything of the sort; it is not essentially a theory of aggression or of resistance or of 
war. Threats of war, yes, or threats of anything else; but it is the employment of threats, or of 
threats  and promises,  or  more  generally  of  the  conditioning  of  one’s  own behaviour  on  the 
behaviour  of  others,  that  the  theory  is  about.”  (Schelling,  op.cit.,  p.  15).  Moreover,  the 
“deterrence” is regarded as if it consists of bargaining between rational, maximizing commercial 
partners.  In  fact,  in  this  approach  the  conflict  coexists  with  mutual  dependence,  and  the 
adversaries are also partners. Schelling calls it “the theory of precarious partnership or the theory 
of incomplete antagonism”.  
 
I.1 Rational conflicts as a process of bargaining 
 
Conflict theory uses game theory to explicate the strategy of adversaries as players in a game 
which is not the zero-sum-game, since there is no unique winner or loser. It also explores other 
types of games: variable-sum-games instead of constant-sum-games. “On the strategy of pure 
                                                              





































conflict - the zero-sum-games - game theory has yielded important insight and advice. But on the 
strategy of action where conflict is mixed with mutual dependence - the nonzero-sum games 
involved in wars and threats of war, strikes, negotiations, criminal deterrence, class war, race 
war, price war, and blackmail...traditional game theory has not yielded comparable insight or 
advice.” (Schelling, 1963, p. 83). The problem with this type of game theory is that it is based on 
the same fundamental assumptions that the zero-sum game is grounded on, namely rationality 
and  maximizing  behaviour.  Three  major  shortcomings  can  be  raised  with  regard  to  the 
methodology of strategic conflict theory.  
 
First,  it  supposes  that  the  agents  are  rational  in  the  sense  that  “the  participants  coolly  and 
“rationally” calculate their advantages according to a consistent value system” (Schelling, 1963, 
p. 16). In social conflicts such as wars, revolutions, or even serious and protracted strikes (such as 
that of English miners against Thatcher’s government), the distinction between costs and benefits 
is blurred, since every individual participant behaves as if s/he represents all the others. In such 
circumstances,  the  social  identity  of  every  individual  or  her/his  behaviour  as  a  dynasty 
overshadows  his/her  individual  interests.  Dying  for  the  “cause”  is  not  only  a  “cost”,  but  is 
considered to be a “benefit”. In other words, as Hirschman justly remarks: “it is in the nature of 
the “public good” or the “public happiness” that striving for it cannot be neatly separated from 
possessing it. This is so because striving for the public happiness will often be felt not so much as 
a cost, but as the closest available substitute for it.” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 9).  
 
Second, individuals participating in a social movement do not have constant choices. They learn 
about social realities through their participation and understand about their own social choice. For 
example, at the beginning of the social unrest in 1978 in Iran, many people did not know about 
the role of the Shah in supporting the corruption and oppression by high officials and the royal 
family. They believed that the king was good, but his associates were corrupt. The same thing is 
true with what the majority of Iranian citizens thought about Khomeini and the Islamic Republic 
on  the  morrow  of  the  Iranian  February  revolution  in  1979.  Lenin  used  to  say  that  during 
revolutionary periods, people learn each day more than what they have learnt in ten years. This 
amounts to saying that during revolutionary periods, as well as during any important collective 
action, individual’s social preferences change very rapidly. The rationality hypothesis requires 
given  preferences  which  are  known  in  advance  and  regrouped  according  to  the  transitivity 
principle. Hence this rapid change of preferences is not consistent with the rationality hypothesis. 
 
Third, in game theory, the costs/benefits and strategies of agents are supposed to be known to the 
agents. It does not mean that game theory ignores uncertainty. It incorporates the parametrical 
type of  uncertainty,  where  the  probability of occurrence of any  event and  the corresponding 
strategy, costs and benefits associated with such an event are known beforehand. Put differently, 
game theory only excludes radical uncertainty and assumes the predictability of events. While 
such an assumption may hold true in generic or routine situations, in case of social conflicts, the 
“rationality” assumption lacks any serious meaning of rationality. In fact, how can the occurrence 
of an event be predicted during social turmoil where everything is in the process of change? As 
Proudhon rightly observed, the predictability of an event is an oxymoron: “The fecundity of the 
unexpected far exceeds the stateman’s prudence.” (Cited in Arendt, 1970, p. 7).  
 
The  singleness  of  every  major  social  conflict  excludes  any  predictability  or  “rationality” 





































Arms and Influence (1966) severely criticised this book for giving credence to the dangerous idea 
that  we can “predict events” and have  “control over their  flow”.  This critique is  even  more 
powerful if we remember that in case of variable-sum-games, in contrast to constant-sum-games, 
each actor’s decision influences the other actor’s decision, and thus the unpredictability concerns 
not only the occurrence of events but also the way each player interprets unprecedented events 
and  anticipates  the  possible  interpretation  of  the  other  player!  Schelling,  himself,  notes  the 
difficulty: “There is no way to build a model for the interaction of two or more decision units, 
with  the  behaviour  and  expectations of  those decision  units  being derived by  purely  formal 
deduction. An analyst can deduce the decisions of a single rational mind if he knows the criteria 
that govern the decisions; but he cannot infer by purely formal analysis what can pass between 
two centres of consciousness. It takes at least two people to test it.” (1963, p. 163).  
 
Now, if the analyst does not know the criteria that govern the decisions of an agent, since the 
agent’s own choice is changing and if the analyst cannot clearly determine the boundaries of 
costs and benefits in the agent’s calculation, and if the analyst cannot know the objective utility 
function of the agent since s/he behaves as if s/he is a collective agent, and if the analyst cannot 
attach any probability to the occurrence of events, then how many people would it take to test our 
game theoretical model?  
 
My  objection  to  the  “strategy  conflict  theory”  does  not  limit  itself  to  these  methodological 
considerations. The major shortcoming of this strand of conflict theory is that the exchange of 
goods and services is stretched to include the “exchange of threats” and the market model is 
assumed  to  deal  with  the power  relationship.  It  does  not consider  the  idiosyncratic  logic of 
coercive power as one of the specific characteristics of genuine social conflicts. As Schelling 
highlights, the theory is not concerned with the efficient application of violence, aggression, or 
war. The conflict is viewed as a process of strategic bargaining. This particular conception of 
“conflict”  is  directly  inspired  by  the  way  commercial  negotiations  and  competitive  market 
strategies are carried out.  
 
Coase’s theorem (1960) can thus be applied to coercive power: individuals have an incentive to 
bargain for the redistribution of wealth under coercion as long as they maximize their joint gains 
and transaction costs are not too great. Exchange of threats does not involve the actual use of 
coercion or destruction; it only requires threat power, or the theoretical possibility of coercion.  
 
Undoubtedly, threats involve a general difficulty. Sen (1983, p. 17) convincingly argued that 
“The person who threatens to harm the other if the bargaining should fail does it at no direct 
advantage to himself (otherwise it won’t be a ‘threat’ but something he may do anyway, and will 
be thus reflected in the fall-back position). While it is plausible to try to get bargaining advantage 
out of a threat during the process of bargaining, once the bargaining has failed, the threatener has 
no obvious interest in carrying out the threat. But that recognition on the part of the threatened 
person would call into question the credibility of the threat itself.”  
 
This is a general predicament in Nash equilibrium theory within the context of extensive games. 
Nevertheless, threats do actually take place. Since competitive equilibrium theory (e.g., subgame 
perfection) does not allow for real threats, it is preferable to apply the Nash equilibrium theory in 






































The extension of the application of Coasian theorem to conflict depicts it as a bargaining process 
between conflictual parties who are simultaneously partners and adversaries (Vahabi, 2009b). 
The problem with this type of extension is that even at an abstract level, “market exchange” 
(voluntary  or  involuntary)  cannot  be  equated  with  an  “exchange  of  threats”.  To  distinguish 
between these two cases, it suffices to compare them with a state of autarky. A voluntary or 
involuntary market exchange is preferable to autarky, but autarky is preferable to the exchange of 
threats. 
 
To  sum  up,  the  “strategy  conflict  theory”  cannot  overcome  the  pitfall  of  the  mainstream 
economics  with  regard  to  social  conflicts,  since  its  fundamental  assumptions  exclude  the 
idiosyncratic logic of coercive power. 
  
I.2 Strategic bargaining models with destructive power 
 
A  recent  economic  study  on  “strategic  bargaining  with  destructive  power”  corroborates  the 
“strategy  conflict  theory”.  This  literature  shares  the  fundamental  assumptions  regarding 
rationality and maximizing behaviour with the conflict theory. It builds upon the non-zero-sum 
game theoretical models. However, the objective of this literature is not to study the “deterrence” 
or other strategic considerations of the cold war period. It tries to capture the role of workers’ 
destructive power as part of “strategic bargaining models”. Its particular fields of application are 
strikes and suspension of talks during the labour contract negotiations (for example between the 
Canadian  Auto  workers  and  General  Motors  in  1998),  commercial  negotiations  during  the 
different rounds of the GATT or the World Trade Organization (WTO), and negotiations between 
trade unions and firms. This literature is concerned not only with efficient strikes, but also with 
the “threat” of strike. Accordingly, one of the main problems examined in this literature is the 
credibility of threats or the commitment to put a threat into effect.  
 
In these game theoretical models, destructive power refers either to the power of bargainers to 
destroy part of the surplus or to their ability to inflict a cost on their opponent, without actually 
damaging the object bargained over. The first form of destructive power is analyzed in Dasgupta 
and  Maskin  (1989),  Manzini  (1997,  1999),  and  Busch  et  al.  (1998).  The  second  form  of 
destructive power is dealt with in Avery and Zemsky (1994) where the authors call such kind of 
activity “money burning”. This literature has tackled both destructive power and commitment to 
use  it.  In  Dasgupta  and  Maskin  (1989)  destructive  power  is  modelled  in  a  way  that  both 
bargainers (employers and employees) have destructive power and can actually destroy part of 
the surplus to be shared. Nevertheless, in their model, commitment by bargainers to use such a 
power plays no role. In Busch et al. (1998), they discuss a bargaining model in which one of the 
players has the power to destroy any proportion of the surplus during disagreement periods.  
 
Like Dasgupta and Maskin (1989), the authors show that destructive power increases the player’s 
bargaining power even in the absence of commitment to use it. Manzini (1999) studies a simple 
two-player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the players is allowed to destroy 
part of the surplus bargained over. Commitment plays no role in this model either. Obviously, 
commitment can arise in a number of real life circumstances, for example, a union can commit 
itself to a predetermined length of strikes in order to increase its bargaining power. Such a kind of 
situation is modelled by Holden (1994). Muthoo (1992) examines a situation where one of the 





































representees and in case he wants to break his commitment, he should bear the cost. Manzini 
(1997) models the joint effect of destructive power and commitment to use it in an alternating 
offers bargaining model in which one of the players can commit to damage the surplus that they 
are bargaining over.  
 
As our review indicates, in all these models, destructive power is studied in the framework of a 
negotiating procedure with hyper-rational, and maximizing agents. All other uses of destructive 
process involving a “total war” or actual destruction are excluded. In fact, for this literature a 
“total war” is just a zero-sum game with rational and maximizing agents, whereas a “partial war” 
should  be  examined  through  more  interesting  and  complicated  non-zero  sum  games.  The 
fundamental problem with this kind of modelling is that social conflicts are limited to bargaining 
procedures  that  remain  within  the ubiquitous  market  rules.  Since  Coase’s  theorem  (1960)  is 
assumed to apply to coercive power, all movements which debilitate the social and economic 
order are excluded. 
 
2. Destructive power and political violence 
 
This section will first introduce “socio-political instability” models and highlight their differences 
with “strategic conflict theory”. Then, a general classification of “political instability” models 
based on the two aspects of political violence, namely motivational and instrumental will be 
discussed. Finally, we will examine successively each type of model and endeavour to show the 
insufficiency of this literature to grasp the institutional aspect of social conflicts reducing them to 
sheer looting. 
 
2.1 Socio-political instability models and conflict theory 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, a neoclassical theory of political violence was developed that can be 
regarded as a strand of public choice theory with particular application for political violence. In 
economics,  this theory is  known as the new political  economy of  “socio-political  instability” 
(Drazen,  2000,  pp.  500-513),  and  in  insurance  theory,  it  is  named  “political  risks”  (Habib-
Deloncle, 1998). There is no unique definition of “political instability”. According to Alesina and 
Perotti (1994, p. 355), there are two ways to define this concept. The first is to construct an index 
of  socio-political  instability  (SPI)  that  summarizes  several  indicators of  more or  less  violent 
forms of political protest and social violence. The SPI approach begins with a list of variables 
that  identify  events  such  as  riots,  political  demonstrations  against  the  government,  and 
assassinations. For instance, Perotti (1996) uses the following index of socio-political instability: 
 
SPI = 1.60 ASSASS + 2.33 DEATH + 7.29 SCOUP + 6. 86 UCOUP - 5.23 DEM 
 
where ASSASS = number of political assassinations per million population per year; DEATH = 
violent deaths per million population per year; SCOUP = number of successful coups per year; 
UCOUP = number of unsuccessful coups per year; and DEM = a dummy variable which is 1 for 
countries with an average value of Jodice and Taylor’s (1988) democracy index of greater than 






































The second (Alesina and Perotti, 1994) focuses on executive turnovers, namely on the frequency 
of  government collapses.  These  two  methods  are  used  by  economists  to  test empirically  the 
impact of political violence on economic growth.  
 
In the insurance literature, a third measure is defined which is directly linked to the security of 
property. This measure is a subjective indicator of “country risk” produced by specialized firms, 
particularly by English, American, and French private insurance companies. The “country risk” 
includes several indicators such as sovereign default risk, risk of nationalization or expropriation, 
inconvertibility  or  non  transferability  of  currencies,  protection  of  expatriate  staff,  measures 
related to the “rule of law” and the enforceability of contracts, and the level of bureaucracy and 
corruption.  Since the end of  the seventies, private insurance  companies such as  Lloyds have 
accepted  to  insure  foreign  branches  of  multinational  corporations  against  “political  risks”  in 
countries where such risks are considered to be high. The insurance contract is confidential and it 
covers risks due to unpredictable events such as revolutions, political or governmental changes, 
wars and civil wars. Since 1996, the global market of “political risk” has radically increased. In 
1998, the total capacity of this market in case of non-enforceability of contracts amounted to 100 
million dollars and the insurance sum in case of expropriation of capital goods exceeded 700 
million dollars (Habib-Deloncle, 1998, p. 1216). This third measure of “country risk” has been 
used by Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), and Svensson (1998) among others.  
 
The burgeoning literature on “political instability” is related to practical needs regarding the costs 
and benefits of political violence and the security of property rights. In contrast to “strategic 
conflict theory”, this literature deals with real or genuine political violence. It cannot be criticized 
for ignoring  real social conflicts and  it  gives the impression that  the neoclassical  theory  has 
finally resumed the classical tradition of political economy. Nevertheless, a closer comparison of 
“strategic  conflict  theory”  with  “political  instability”  literature  displays  the  theoretical 
consistency of  the former and  the  lack of solid theoretical  assumptions of  the  latter.  In fact, 
“strategic conflict theory” had no claim to represent realistic conflicts; it was mainly concerned 
with “rational conflict” or “threat” as part of a bargaining procedure between parties who were 
supposed to be both partners and adversaries.  
 
The  adoption  of  “rationality”  and  “maximizing”  assumptions  by  conflict  theorists  was 
incompatible  with  realistic  conflicts,  but  these  assumptions  were  entirely  consistent  with  a 
normative theory of rational conflict. In “political instability” literature, the object of modelling 
is not a rational but realistic conflict; however the fundamental assumptions of “rationality” and 
“maximization” are maintained. In this case, the theoretical inconsistency between real conflict 
and  expected  rationality  assumptions  is  dismissed  by  postulating  an  individual  maximizing 
behaviour  for  a  rioter  or  a  revolutionary  militant.  Put  differently,  the  theorists  of  “political 
instability” usually rule out particular political, psychological, or social motivations for political 
violence and assume pure individual economic motivation for participants in political violence in 
order to investigate the utilitarian dimension of political violence. Their method in social science 
can be named “economic imperialism”
6. And it is not so hard to show the incongruousness of 
their assumptions with the motivations involved in real social conflicts.  
                                                              
6 Lazear  defines  “economic  imperialism” as  follows:  “Economists, almost  without  exception,  make constrained 
maximization the basic building block of any theory...the theoretical revisions almost never drop the assumption that 






































In fact, Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action proclaimed the impossibility of collective 
action for large groups due to free-rider problem just before the explosion of important social 
movements at the end of the sixties in the Western countries. If any individual can benefit from 
collective action without sharing the costs of actively participating in it, then there can be no 
revolution  made  by  masses.  There  can  only  be  revolutions  made  by  “small  conspiratorial 
groups”:  “It  is  natural  then  that  the  “Marxian”  revolutions  that  have  taken  place  have  been 
brought about by small conspiratorial elites that took advantage of weak governments during 
periods of social disorganization.” (Olson, 19651980, p. 106).  
 
Despite the inconsistency between Olson’s theory and the reality of massive social movements, 
his theory was widely praised, and it is now considered to be one of the pioneer contributions of 
public  choice  theory.  Hirschman’s  explanation  of  this  paradoxical  phenomenon  is  thought 
provoking: “It seems to me paradoxically conceivable that the success of Olson’s book owes 
something to its having been contradicted by the subsequently evolving events. Once the latter 
had safely run their course, the many people who found them deeply upsetting could go back to 
the Logic of Collective Action and find in it good and reassuring reasons why those collective 
actions of the sixties should never have happened in the first place, were perhaps less real than 
they seemed, and would be most unlikely ever to recur. Thus the book did not suffer from being 
contradicted by subsequent events; rather, it gained by actively contradicting them and became a 
great  success  among  those  who  found  these  events  intolerable  and  totally  aberrant.  In  this 
manner,  false  prophecy  can  be  the  foundation  stone  of  fame  and  reputation  in  the  social 
sciences.” (Hirschman, 1982, pp. 78-79). Hirschman is, of course, not a partisan of “economic 
imperialism”. He stresses in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty that he has been guilty, not of imperialist 
ambition or designs, but rather the opposite, namely “the desire to convince economists of the 
importance and usefulness, for the analysis of economic phenomena, of an essentially political 
concept such as voice.” (1974, pp. 7-8; see also Hirschman, 1981, pp. 267-68). This theoretical 
polemic between Hirschman and Olson touches one of the most controversial aspects of conflict 
theory, namely the motivational underpinnings of political violence.            
    
2.2 Motivational and instrumental aspects of political violence  
 
The concept of political violence should be clearly distinguished from the notion of conflict in 
“conflict  theory”.  Sociologists  and  economists  have  both  stressed  this  distinction.  Schelling 
differentiates  between  “rational”  and  “non-rational”  conflict,  Coser  (1956,  p. 59)  demarcates 
“realistic”  from  “non-realistic”  conflict,  and  Galtung  (1965,  p.  349)  pinpoints  the  difference 
between “destructive behaviour” and “conflict behaviour”. The distinction is not linguistic or 
descriptive, but analytical. The essence of the distinction is “between actions instrumental in 
securing the values sought and actions destructive for their own sake. The analytic usefulness of 
the distinction  is not  in question;  what  is questionable  is  attempting  to  account  for  political 
violence using theoretical approaches that assume that only the instrumental manifestations of 
violence are relevant or subject to analysis.” (Gurr, 1970, p. 45; the first two emphases are mine).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
determined by forces beyond the control of individuals. Most sociologists, by contrast, argue that understanding the 
constraints is more important than understanding the behaviour that results from optimization, given the constraints.” 







































Conflict theorists,  such  as Coser and  Galtung,  acknowledge this double aspect of  conflictual 
behaviour. However, economists are mainly concerned  with the  instrumentalist aspect of  the 
behaviour, since it can be easily fitted in a utilitarian approach consistent with rationality and 
maximizing assumptions. Political scientists (Huntington, 1968; Gurr, 1970) have taken issue 
with the question of the ubiquity of costs/benefits motivation in analyzing political  violence. 
They stress the interest of analyzing political violence for its own sake (i.e. motivational aspect of 
political violence) as well as for its tactical or instrumental value (i.e. instrumental aspect of 
political violence).  
 
Incorporating both aspects of political violence in a general theory of violence, Gurr (1970) gives 
equal  weight  to  “non-rational  origins  and  manifestations”  of  conflictual  behaviour.  He 
particularly  invokes  frustration  and  fear  as  psychological drives  of  violence,  and  develops  a 
theory of “relative deprivation” to explain the potential for collective and political violence. By 
“relative  deprivation”,  he  means  the  discrepancy  that  people  perceive  between  their  value 
expectations and their value capabilities (Gurr, 1970, p. 37). For example, a discrepancy between 
what people actually possess in terms of political and economic goods and what they think is 
justly theirs, can be defined as their “relative deprivation” (RD). Inspired by the Freudian theory 
of  sexual  urge  and  death  wish,  Gurr  considers  men  to  have  a  capacity  but  not  a  need  for 
aggression. The  need  for  aggression is  related  to RD. Hence the basic  frustration-aggression 
proposition is that the greater the frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression against the 
source of frustration.  
 
This postulate provides the motivational base for an initial proposition about political violence: 
the greater the intensity of deprivation, the greater the magnitude of violence. Gurr focuses on 
three forms of political violence, namely turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war. The theory of RD 
tries  to  explicate  all  “relatively  spontaneous,  unorganized  political  violence  with  substantial 
popular  participation”  (riots),  as  well  as  “highly  organized  political  violence  with  limited 
participation” (conspiracy),  and “highly  organized political  violence  with  widespread popular 
participation”  (internal  war)  (op.cit.,  p.  11).  Thus,  political  violence  includes  all  subversive 
activities and is not limited to conflicts within a political or social order. In this sense, it is part 
and parcel of destructive power, although destructive power also embraces non-violent forms of 
social conflicts (Vahabi, 2004).  
 
RD theory pertains to individual psychological motivations of participants in political violence 
and  it  usually  overrides  the  peculiarities  of  social  conflict  itself.  For  instance,  Gurr’s  main 
conclusion  is  that  “(T)here  are  violent  societies,  that  we  know  something  about  how  they 
originate and perpetuate themselves, and that the discontents that precede violence in them are 
probably more amenable to change than the attitudes that justify it.” (1970, p. 192). But are there 
really “violent societies”? Taking Vietnam as an example, can we say that the protracted national 
liberation war of the Vietnamese people was due to their “frustration-anger” or RD motives?  
 
It seems to me that the Vietnamese resort to violence can be better understood if we take on 
board  three social  facts: 1) the use of violence by the  United  States of  America against  the 
Vietnamese  people;  2)  the  intensity  of  the  struggle  and  its  protracted  character;  and  3)  the 
international situation that could not prevent the United States to launch the war against Vietnam. 





































violence be explained by their “frustration-anger”. Frustration-anger or RD do not necessarily 
lead to political violence. Many other factors, notably social and institutional ones, are crucial for 
the emergence of political violence. Despite these critical remarks, Gurr’s contribution has the 
particular merit of inquiring into the nature and the genesis of political violence. His theory of 
political violence influenced certain economists who analyze “political instability” on the basis of 
psychological assumptions about human behaviour.  
 
Gupta  (1990)  clearly  follows  Gurr’s  theory  of  RD.  Although  Gupta’s  main  concern  is  the 
instrumental  aspect  of  political  violence,  he  does  not  ignore  the  motivational  aspect. 
Consequently, he develops a rational expectation model of political violence without assuming a 
maximizing behaviour. Nonetheless, the majority of economic models on “political instability” 
completely  ignore  the  motivational  or  causal  aspects  of  political  violence,  and  focus  on  its 
economic  effects  or  on  its  instrumental  aspect.  According  to  Hirshleifer  (1991a,  p.  130), 
modelling  of  conflict  began  with  Fredrick  Lanchester  ([1916]  1956).  The  importance  of 
Lanchester’s  simple  model  in  analyzing  “fighting  efficiency”  parameters  of  two  conflicting 
forces and their relative attrition rates notwithstanding, “political stability models” are inspired by 
Haavelmo’s long-neglected contribution on economic evolution. In this book, the author provided 
a canonical general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative (or 
“grabbing” according to Haavelmo’s terminology) and productive activities in order to develop a 
theory of international or inter-regional trade (Haavelmo, 1954, pp. 91-98).  
 
In this model, Haavelmo acknowledges rationality postulate (1954, p. 84), but he does not adopt 
the maximizing assumption. He uses a set of “conjectural response functions” for describing the 
possible reaction of one region towards the other regions with regard to “productive, grabbing, 
and protection” activities (1954, pp. 94-98). Summarizing the results of his study regarding the 
inter-regional activities compared to a centralized or a completely decentralized economy, the 
author pinpoints that “There is absolutely no reason to assume that there should be any automatic 
tendency  towards an ‘optimal’ policy  with  regard  to world output in  the  same sense  as in a 
centrally  directed  economic unit. The  decisive  factors  in  shaping  the  historical  interrelations 
between the regions may well have been conjectures regarding countermeasures, coupled with 
hopes for gains in a free-for-all atomistic market.” (1954, p. 98).  
 
Contrary to the conflict theory or the political instability models, Haavelmo’s early model of 
“grabbing” activities is not based upon the maximizing assumption.  Nevertheless, a number of 
theorists have reinvented his formalization of this problem and added the maximizing hypothesis 
in order to develop a general equilibrium model of appropriative or predatory activity. These 
models are constructed on rationality and maximizing assumptions and they can be grouped in 
three strands of formal modelling.  
  
The first strand develops a rational expectation model of conflictual behaviour which takes into 
consideration insurrections, riots, and other forms of political violence. However, in dealing with 
political collective violence, two different approaches can be distinguished. The first approach 
assumes  that  successful  insurrections  mainly  produce  social  benefits  from  which  active 
insurgents cannot exclude non partisans. These social-benefit theories stress the importance of 
such factors as “ideology”, class identification, and anomie in overcoming the free-rider problem 
associated  with non excludability  (Roemer,  1985,  1988;  Gupta,  1990).  The  second  approach 





































(Tullock, 1974; Usher and Engineer, 1987; Popkin, 1988; Taylor; 1988; Tong; 1988; Grossman, 
1991, Macculloch, 2005, Collier and Hoeffler, 2007)
7.  
 
The  second  strand  follows  Grossman  and  Kim’s  (1995,  1996a)  model  of  predation  which 
describes the allocation of resources to productive, predatory, or defensive activities. Grossman 
and Kim (1996b) apply the predation model to growth. Following the same line of modelling, 
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002, 2005), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) and Stefandis (2007) 
examine  the  relationships between property  rights  institutions,  appropriation  and openness  to 
international trade. 
 
The third strand, known as “common property models”, pertains to situations where the property 
rights are threatened to be expropriated and redistributed, and examines the implications of such 
insecurity. In common property models, society is described as a sum of powerful groups which 
are either in  a cooperative or in a conflictual relationship.  Social conflict is  modelled as the 
appropriative activity of a group for its own self-interest instead of cooperating with other groups. 
This “rent-seeking” activity can follow two different types of strategies.  
 
The first type of strategy can be dubbed “simple strategy” and it consists of appropriating an 
optimal constant rate of the common property for one’s own interest. The second type of strategy 
is more complicated, since it alludes to a variable rate of appropriation of the common property 
by rent-seekers. This rate depends on the amount of wealth  and is called “wealth dependent 
strategies”.  Thus  the  third  strand  of  socio-political  instability  models  or  “common  property 
models” can  be  divided  into  two  sub-group  models:  1) The  “common  property  models  with 
constant  appropriation”  (Drazen,  2000,  pp.  502-507).  Tornell  and  Velasco,  1992;  Lane  and 
Tornell, 1996, 1999; Tornell, 1997 have developed such kind of models; and 2) the “common 
property models with wealth-dependent appropriation” (Drazen, 2000, pp. 507-513). Benhabib 
and  Rustichini  (1996)  and  Long  and  Soger  (2004)  have  modelled  this  version  of  common 
property models. The following table summarizes theories on political violence. 
                                                              
7 In his survey of “models of domestic political conflict”, Lichbach (1992), distinguishes two different branches of 
formal modeling in conflict theory: i) international conflict; ii) domestic political conflict (DPC). He claims that 
while formal modelers of international conflict think of themselves as working within a field, formal modelers of 
DPC do not cite each other and do not constitute a real field. The main result of his survey is that “there are only two 
modeling  traditions  in  DPC  studies  that  are  cumulative:  stochastic  modeling  and  expected  utility  modeling. 
Stochastic  modelers  have  consistently  depicted  outbreaks  of  DPC  as  random.  Expected  utility  modelers  have 
consistently depicted rational rebels as choosing not to rebel. These traditions are not only internally cumulative; 
they also turn out to be externally consistent.” (1992, p. 342). The interest of an exhaustive literature review on this 
topic notwithstanding,  Lichbach’s survey  suffers  from some  important  shortcomings. For  instance,  he classifies 
Hirschman (1970) and Gurr (1970) under the general title of “Rational choice models”, and more specifically cites 
Hirschman’s model (1970) as a “deterministic utility maximization” model (1992, p. 354) and Gurr’s model (1970) 
as a “spatial theory” (1992, 357). Gupta (1990) is also classified as “expected utility model” (1992, p. 354), whereas 
Gupta’s model denies the maximizing assumption. Moreover, in Lichbach’s long list of references, Haavelmo (1954) 






































Table 1. A taxonomy of real and rational conflict theories 





or threat power 
Real conflict for its 
own sake  
(motivational aspect) 




Haavelmo (1954)    Frustration-anger, 
political  instability 
theory,  and  Ideology’s 
effect,  or  general 
equilibrium  models  of 
insurrection  with  social 
benefits  for  insurgents 






Schelling  (1963, 
1966)  
  I.  General  equilibrium 
models  of  insurrection 
with  private  benefits  for 
insurgents  (Olson,  1965; 
Tullock,  1974;  Popkin, 
1988;  Taylor,  1988; 
Tong,  1988;  Grossman, 
1991,  Collier  and 
Hoeffler,  2007;  Blattman 
and Miguel, 2009). 
II.  Predation  model 
(Grossman  and  Kim 
1995,  1996a,b;  Anderson 
and  Marcouiller,  2002, 
2005) 
III.  Common  property 
models:  1)  Common 
property  models  with 
constant  appropriation 
(Lane and Tornell, 1999); 
2)  Common  property 
models  with  wealth-
dependent  appropriation 
(Benhabib and Rustichini, 
1996;  Tornell,  1997; 
Long and Sorger, 2004) 




  Relative  deprivation 
theory 
Gurr, 1970 




Apart from these theoretical models, there exists a vast literature on econometric tests which are 






































8. Although the pioneer studies of Hibbs (1973) show that political instability has no 
effect  on  growth,  several  papers  find  a  significant  negative  relation  between  socio-political 
instability and economic growth (Drazen, 2000, p. 523). Due to political instability and insecurity 
regarding property rights, the level of investment decreases and subsequently, economic growth 
declines. Hence two questions should be answered. First, what is the cause of political instability 
that leads to sharp reductions in economic growth? Second, in what kind of political regime can 
political risks lead to expropriation?  
 
Rodrik (1997) tackles these two questions and provides some very general answers. He considers 
the “depth of pre-existing social cleavages in a society, along the lines of wealth, ethnic identity, 
geographical  region”  as  the  basis  of  “latent”  social  conflicts  that  can  bring  about  political 
instability.  In  such  a  society,  if  the  domestic  institutions  of  conflict  management  have  weak 
conflict  resolution,  then  a  serious  political  crisis  can  turn  into  a  situation  of  expropriation. 
Rodrik’s analysis addresses motivational factors that underpin social conflicts. Conversely, some 
authors argue that where a rebellion is financially and military feasible it will occur regardless of 
the motivation of rebels. “Feasibility rather than motivation is decisive for the risk of rebellion” 
(Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009, p. 23). Econometric tests strongly support the significance 
of  feasibility  hypothesis.  Blattman  and  Miguel  (2009)  also  insist  on  the  importance  of 
econometric tests regarding the causes of civil war. However, they argue that micro level analysis 
and data are needed to truly decipher war’s causes, and understand the recruitment, organization, 
and conduct of armed groups. Finally, the consequences of civil war are particularly discussed in 
Collier and Hoeffler (2007).  
     
 
2.3 Political instability models 
 
In this section, I discuss three types of modelling of socio-political instability, namely the rational 
expectation model of political violence, predation models, and common property models. In each 
case,  we  will only  substantiate canonical  models  which have been  the  source  of  subsequent 
discussions and refinements. Other models are only quoted in relation to these canonical models. 
Our  critical  survey  will  single  out  the  importance of  motivational  and  ideological  factors  in 
rational  expectation  models.  For  this  type of  modelling,  the  maximization  assumption  is  not 
required.  However,  predation  models  and  common  property  models  insist  on  maximization 
assumption  and  privately  interested  individuals.  The  utilitarian  dimension  of  violence  is 
particularly emphasized in predation models to explain insurrections and other violent forms of 
destructive activity. The inconsistencies of this type of modelling with historical evidences will 
be documented. Finally, “organized social groups” and “voracity effect” will be identified as 
specific features of common property models.    
 
2.3.1 Rational expectation models of political violence  
 
Rational expectation models of political violence can be grouped in two different types. The first 
type  comprises  of  social-benefit  theories  which  underline  the  importance  of  such  factors  as 
ideology. John Roemer’s (1985) contribution to the analysis of revolution as a two-person game 
                                                              






































is a good example. He believes that free riding in revolutionary coalitions is indeed overcome by 
a change in agents’ preferences from those of the prisoner’s dilemma to those of the assurance 
game.  By  “assurance  game”,  I  mean  a  game  in  which  each  agent derives  more utility  from 
cooperating  than  from  defecting,  given  the  other  one  cooperates.  According  to  Roemer, 
“Revolutionary participation simply cannot be explained by side payments or coercion, factors 
appealed to in the pure self-interest model (Olson).” (1985, 90).  
 
He also assumes that Lenin and the Tsar are both non-ideological in the sense that each behaves 
in a disinterested manner to achieve his goal. Lenin maximizes the probability of revolution, and 
the Tsar minimizes it. Nevertheless, each of them finds it optimal to behave in what might be 
interpreted by an outside observer as ideological
9. Roemer (1985, p. 90; 1988, p. 234) “endows 
Lenin with a charisma which enables him to convince people to behave cooperatively” and to 
participate massively in the revolution against the Tsar, although the layers of the population who 
do not have sufficient political courage to rise against the Tsar will also benefit from Lenin’s 
progressive program if the revolution achieves victory. It is noteworthy that contrary to Roemer, 
Mancur Olson ([1965] 1980, p. 106) and Gordon Tullock (1974, p. 45) claim that Lenin never 
tried  to  overcome  the  free-rider  problem  in  the  Russian  revolution,  since  his  organizational 
project to build the Russian Social-democratic party, as defined in What is to be done (1902), was 
based on the idea of “professional revolutionaries”. In other words, Lenin was relying on “a 
committed, self-sacrificing, and disciplined minority, rather than on the common interests of the 
mass of the proletariat.” (Olson, ([1965] 1980, p. 106).  
 
It is true that rational, value-maximizing thinking about the uses of violence is more characteristic 
of  leaders  than  followers.  But  revolutions  are  not  made by  leaders;  they  are  made  by  large 
masses.  There  exist  many  examples  to  illustrate  the  uselessness  of  conspiracies  to  provoke 
revolutions. Janos (1964, p. 81) notes that Louis Auguste Blanqui called out the people of Paris 
thirteen  times  in  the  mid-  and  late-nineteenth  century,  but  never  successfully.  In  1870,  “the 
workers of Paris stood by apathetically while Blanqui and his storming party were arrested after 
an unsuccessful appeal to the masses, yet only three weeks later the same masses spontaneously 
rose to overthrow the government of Louis Napoleon.” (Janos, 1964, p. 84). Leaders are more 
prone to “rational, value-maximizing” calculation about the use of violence, but they are also less 
immune to errors and “irrationality” as Blanqui’s example illustrates!  
 
Gupta (1990) provides another example of the social-benefits theory of collective rebellion. In 
this type of modelling, the maximizing assumption is denied. Other theorists emphasize the fact 
that  social  consequences  of  insurrection  do  not  preclude  having  private  returns  (Usher  and 
Engineer, 1987; Popkin, 1988; Taylor, 1988; Tong; 1988, Macculloch, 2005). A salient example 
of this type of approach is Grossman’s general equilibrium model of insurrection. In this model, 
the peasant families, as the ruled class, respond to the ruler’s policies by allocating their labour 
time  to  production,  soldiering,  or  participation  in  an  insurrection  “with  the  objective  of 
maximizing their expected income. In a successful insurrection, the insurgents take as booty all of 
the revenue of the ruler and his clientele.” (Grossman, 1991, p. 912; the emphasis is mine).  
 
                                                              
9 In fact, Roemer tries to rationalize what might otherwise appear as “ideological” behaviour of Lenin and the Tsar. 
He models “ideology” as “a (self-imposed) limitation by the agent on the set of feasible strategies he might choose in 





































Put differently, insurgents behave like looters, since their main objective is to enrich themselves. 
Grossman even defines insurrection in such a way that the distinction between “revolutionaries” 
and  “bandits”  becomes  blurred:  “The  analysis  that  follows  defines  insurrection  generally  to 
include any forceful action against the established system of property rights and taxation. This 
definition does not distinguish  between  rebels  or  revolutionaries…and bandits  or pirates…In 
actual cases, this distinction can be blurred (see, for example, the discussion of pre-modern China 
in  James  Tong  [1988])”  (1991,  p.  913).  Perhaps  the  distinction  between  revolutionaries  and 
bandits is blurred in “pre-modern China”
10, but it is hard to sully this distinction in the American 
Revolution  for  independence  (1776),  the  French  Revolution  (1789),  the  Russian  Revolution 
(1917),  the recent  Iranian Revolution  (1979), or  in  all other  major revolutions. This private-
benefits type of modelling builds upon rationality and maximizing assumptions and it has been 
further  developed  by  Predation  models.  In  this  section,  we  examine  social-benefits  theory, 
particularly the work of Gupta (1990), since he explicitly advocates a rational expectation model 
of collective rebellion without postulating a maximizing behaviour.    
 
Borrowing  from  Gurr’s  (1970) work,  Gupta  (1990) develops a rational  expectation model of 
political  violence.  He  acknowledges  the  importance  of  individual  psychological  impulsions, 
particularly  that  of  frustration  or  relative  deprivation,  in  explaining  aggressive  behaviour. 
However, he argues that relative deprivation cannot be the sole explanation of aggression and 
notes that the broad definition of “frustration” fails to specify the kind of aggressive act in which 
an individual is likely to engage (Gupta, 1990, p. 84). He distinguishes five acts of collective 
rebellion:  political  demonstrations,  riots,  political  strikes,  armed  or  guerrilla  attacks,  and 
assassinations  (op.cit.,  p.  104).  According  to  Gupta,  all  these  forms  of  violence  are  “anti-
systemic” in the sense that they are not “system neutral” conflicts or conflicts within the rules of 
the market (op.cit., pp. 15, 19). He pinpoints the role of such conflicts in institutional change. 
Frustration  does  not  always  lead  to  aggressive  behaviour.  The  step  between  frustration  and 
aggression  is  not  direct  and  is  complicated  by  choice  of  action  (with  varying  degrees  of 
satisfaction or benefit), fear of retaliation, and ideology.  
 
In fact, “a rational actor will weigh his choice of action against its possible consequences in light 
of all these factors.” (op.cit., p. 85). So a model explaining participatory behaviour in political 
actions must be based on a costs/benefits analysis. Moreover, the frustration that one feels as an 
individual may not always be translated into political action. Instead “it may lead to criminal 
activities,  or  an  individual  may  engage  in  psychotic  behaviour  ranging  from  homicidal  to 
suicidal. But when will frustration lead to political violence?” Gupta argues that “for the feeling 
of frustration to translate into a collective action, it must relate to the collective identity” (op.cit., 
p. 85). This collective identity implies an ideological orientation. Hence, Gupta suggests that 
Gurr’s frustration theory be amended by a costs/benefits analysis and that ideology or “collective 
interests” be included in the utility function of agents.  
                                                              
10 Not only in China but also in many other countries, social banditry is not limited to “plundering”, “looting” or 
pirate activities. In fact, social banditry is rural, not urban. The peasant societies in which it occurs know rich and 
poor, powerful and weak, rulers and ruled, but remain “profoundly and tenaciously traditional, and pre-capitalist in 
structure. The bandit is a pre-political phenomenon, and his strength is in inverse proportion to that of organized 
agrarian revolutionism and socialism or communism.” (Hobsbawm, 1963, p. 23, underlined by me). Hence, it is a 
little incongruous to compare “pre-modern” social banditry in China with modern political revolutions in order to 
sully the distinction between “revolutionaries” and “pirates”. Nevertheless, even in pre-modern social banditry, the 






































The only point which distinguishes Gupta’s analysis from Gurr’s theory of violence is Gupta’s 
standpoint  on  costs/benefits  analysis.  Gupta  is  mainly  concerned  with  the  instrumental  or 
utilitarian aspect of political violence, although he does not neglect the value of political violence 
for its own sake, especially in defining the individual’s participatory motivation. This explains 
why  he  proposes  a  rational  expectation  model  of  political  violence  without  the  maximizing 
assumption.  
 
Undoubtedly, there is a tactical use of violence, since it can be used for value enhancement or for 
“looting”. The most direct utilitarian use of violence is to seize a desired good, as rioters do when 
they pillage warehouses and as conspirators do in a coup d’état. Other tactical uses of violence 
are anti-government riots and strikes which are sometimes designed to induce rulers to change 
undesirable  policies.  A  common  indirect  use  of  violence  is  to  demonstrate  symbolically  the 
demands  of  those  resorting  to  violence  and  the  intensity  with  which  they  vindicate  these 
demands. In other words, it displays the capacity of protestors to disrupt the socio-political order 
if their demands are not met. Nevertheless, there exists a great difference between looters and 
social protestors in resorting to violence. In the former case, the “rational” calculation of looting 
is based on a net separation of costs and benefits, whereas in the case of political protests, there 
is usually no such net separation between costs and benefits. As Hirschman (1982, pp. 85-86) 
notes, the neat distinction between costs and benefits of action in the public interest vanishes, 
since striving, which should be entered on the cost side, turns out to be part of the benefit.  
 
Furthermore,  in  every  revolutionary  movement,  “revolutionary  idealism”  (Plekhanov,  1894 
1974)  or  “revolutionary  utopianism”  (Gurr,  1970,  p.  216)  has  played  a  great  role.  What  is 
“revolutionary  idealism”?  It  is  the  illusion  of  having  the  ability  to  end  all  the  inequality, 
oppression and misery in one stroke and to create a harmonious fraternal society just on the 
morrow of revolution. This wave of optimism during the revolutionary period reflects the relative 
ignorance of revolutionaries about the real potential of revolution and it is usually followed by a 
wave of pessimism after the end of the revolutionary period. If one adopts a consistent utilitarian 
outlook, one may ask whether this “revolutionary idealism” enhances the interests of revolution. 
My answer to this question is affirmative. I argue that a utilitarian approach is not necessarily a 
good bedfellow of rationality.  
 
One good example is the illusion of French Enlighteners about whom Plekhanov writes very 
lucidly: “Turn the pages of Mably’s Doutes, proposés aux philosophes économistes or Morelli’s 
Code de la nature and you will see that inasmuch as these writers’ views differed from those held 
by the vast majority of  the Enlighteners in respect of the conditions for human  welfare,  and 
inasmuch as they dreamt of the abolition of private property, they, in the first place, came into 
glaring contradictions with the most essential and vital needs of the nation in their times, and, in 
the second place, vaguely aware of that, they themselves considered their aspirations absolutely 
impracticable. Consequently, I ask you again: wherein lay the ignorance of the Enlighteners? Did 
it consist in the fact that, while being aware of the social needs of their times and correctly 
indicating how they could be met (through the abolition of the old privileges, and the like), they 
attributed an extremely exaggerated significance to the methods needed, i.e., the significance of a 
road towards universal happiness? This was not yet crass ignorance; from the practical point of 





































universal significance of the reforms they demanded, the more energetically they had to work for 
their achievement.” (1897 1976, p. 240, the last paragraph is emphasized by me).  
 
Revolutionary idealism or utopianism is the source of extraordinary efforts which make possible 
the overthrow of entrenched regimes. Another salient example of the efficiency of this type of 
utopianism is the creation of one of the most powerful, courageous, efficient and yet cheapest 
army of Europe under Napoleon Bonaparte. This revolutionary army was the most formidable 
child of the Jacobinic Republic. From a “levée en masse” of revolutionary citizens it soon turned 
into a force of professional fighters, for there were no call-ups between 1793 and 1798, and those 
who  had  no  taste  or  talent  for  soldiering  deserted  massively.  It  therefore  retained  the 
characteristics of the Revolution and acquired those of the vested interest; the typical Bonapartist 
mixture.  
 
Regarding the origin of this army during the Terror period, Hobsbawm writes: “(B)y March 1794 
an army three times as large as before was run at half the cost of March 1793, and the value of 
the  French  currency...was  kept  approximately  stable,  in  marked  contrast  to  both  past  and 
future...The Republic of the Year II had coped with worse crises and with fewer resources.” 
(1962, p. 68). How could they reduce the costs of the army so drastically and so rapidly? The 
answer can be found in the reports of Savant, one of the soldiers of this army, who is quoted by 
Hobsbawm: “Do you know what kind of government (was victorious)? ...A government of the 
Convention. A government of passionate Jacobins in red bonnets, wearing rough woollen cloth, 
wooden shoes, who lived on simple bread and bad beer and went to sleep on mattresses laid on 
the floor of their meeting-halls, when they were too tired to wake and deliberate further. That is 
the kind of men who saved France.” (1962, p. 68).  
 
Personal  sacrifices  are  the  source  of  this high  and  rapid  reduction  of  costs.  Such  a  kind of 
economies of resources is done in all revolutions without any exception and it naturally remains a 
puzzle for the Olsonian’s theory of the free-rider behaviour! Moreover, the interesting point is 
that the revolutionary masses usually make such great sacrifices because of their “revolutionary 
utopianism”, namely their relative ignorance, and not because of their “rationality”. But does it 
mean  that  “revolutionary  utopianism”  is  devoid  of  all  historical  rationality?  Revolutionary 
utopianism has no ex ante rationality, but it has an ex post rationality, since no revolution can 
achieve its goals without great sacrifices by masses who are not concerned about the costs and 
benefits of  their  actions.  If  revolution is  a particular  form  of collective action  to  change  the 
existing socio-political rules, then revolutionary utopianism is a necessary condition for changing 
existing rules with the least costs. In this sense, revolutionary utopianism is ex post rational.  
 
2.3.2 Predation models 
 
A second strand of socio-political instability modelling is derived from the “predation model” 
(Grossman and Kim, 1996a). This model is developed in the general theoretical framework of 
conflictual  behaviour  as  a  rent-seeking  activity.  The  fundamental postulates of  the economic 
theory of conflict can be summarized in two points: “1. Optimization: Each competitor chooses a 
preferred balance of productive effort and conflictual effort. 2. Equilibrium: On the social level, 
the separate optimizing decisions interact to determine levels of production and the extent of 
fighting activity, together with the distribution of production among the claimants.” (Hirshleifer, 






































As a general principle, resources can be used not only for production but also for appropriative 
purposes such as theft and warfare. “Individuals and groups can either produce and thus create 
wealth or seize the wealth created by others.” (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 1996, p. 1). Predation 
models are parts of an emerging literature on conflict and appropriation (Skogh and Stuart, 1982; 
Hirshleifer,  1987, 1991a, b, 1995;  Findlay,  1996; Skaperdas, 1992; Garfinkel and  Skaperdas, 
1996; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1996).  This type of modelling is also used to examine the 
effect of insecure property and its accompanying enforcement costs on the efficiency of exchange 
(Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2002). In the same vein, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002, 2005), 
and  Stefandis  (2007)  study  the  relationships  between  property  rights  institutions  and 
appropriation in case of autarky and openness to international trade. 
 
In  this  literature,  the  use of  force,  or  the  threat  of  using  force,  is  a  primary  determinant of 
aggregate  outcomes;  appropriative  activities  include  the  use  of  swords,  bombs,  or  guns. 
Individuals and pressure groups are supposed to be involved in appropriating goods from others. 
The wealth of a richer agent gives a poor agent an incentive to prey on the richer agent and, 
perhaps, even to be a pure predator. Jack Hirshleifer (1991b) provides an interesting example 
alluding to what he calls “the paradox of power”. This paradox can be defined in following terms: 
if  the  relative  endowment  of  an  agent  is  sufficiently  small,  then  that  agent  allocates  all  its 
resources to predatory activities. Grossman and Kim (1995) have developed a predation model 
with two  agents  in which purely aggressive equilibrium is excluded and no  agent is entirely 
specialized in predatory activities. Grossman and Kim (1996a) relax this assumption to allow for 
the possibility that a poor agent might choose to specialize in predatory activity
11.   
 
In  this  model,  there  exist  two  types  of  agents:  1)  a  predetermined  potential  predator,  who 
allocates his/her resources to producing consumption goods and “offensive weapons” in order to 
appropriate  the  prey’s  property;  2)  a  predetermined  potential  prey,  who  allocates  his/her 
                                                              
11 Grossman and Kim (1996a) cite the Vikings and the Mongols as historical evidences of the type of specialisation 
in pure predatory activity. But the Vikings and the Mongols were not poor people. The navigation power of the 
Vikings and the pastoral way of life among the Mongols may be better reasons to explicate their specialization in 
predatory activity. Another good example is the Spartans who prospered while at war but began to decline once they 
reached a position of  supremacy. They did not understand what being at peace meant  and  never  attached  any 
importance to any other kind of activity than training for war. Aristotle writes: “Public finance is another thing that is 
badly managed by the Spartans. They are obliged to undertake large wars, but there is never any money in the 
treasury.” (Politics, p. 90). The Spartans were not poor, but they were bad in managing their public finance, whereas 
they  were great warriors.  In other  words, they  could  more easily  deal  with a war  economy than  with a peace 
economy; this is also true for the Vikings and the Mongols. In my opinion, specialization in predatory activity does 
not depend necessarily on “poverty” or “wealth”, but on the particular allocation of resources on different types of 
entrepreneurial  talents  (productive  or  predatory  ones).  Contrary  to  the  contention  of  Hirshleifer  (1991b)  and 
Grossman and Kim (1996a), historical evidence does not always confirm that “poor agents” choose to specialize in 
predatory activity.  In  fact, many historical  examples illustrate  the  fact  that rich agents  choose to  specialize  in 
predatory activity. Skaperdas and Syropoulos’s (1996) model as well as Kennedy’s book (1989) highlight the close 
relationship between commerce and war, or between trade and colonialist policies. Aristotle argues that equality of 
wealth will not put an end to stealing and he also notes that rich people can specialize in predatory activity. He 
considers this behaviour as “major crime”: “As for major crimes, men commit them when their aims are extravagant, 
not just to provide themselves with necessities. Who ever heard of a man making himself a tyrant in order to keep 
warm? For the same reason, the magnitude of the crime, there is more credit in slaying a tyrant than slaying a thief. 
So we may conclude that the typical characteristics of Phaleas’s constitution would be a protection only against 





































resources to produce consumption goods and “defensive fortifications”. The model abstracts from 
all  specific  institutional  setups  and  concentrates  on  a  general  equilibrium  with  predatory 
activities.  The  authors  investigate  three  types of  equilibria:  1)  a  non-aggressive  equilibrium, 
where a predator  devotes no efforts on predation; 2)  a pure predation equilibrium, where  a 
predator    devotes  no  efforts  on  production;  3)  a  part-time  predation  equilibrium,  where  a 
predator divides his/her efforts between productive and predatory activities. The modelling is 
based on a game theoretical framework. The prey has to move first and s/he disposes of an initial 
endowment (e
d). This initial endowment is the constraint under which the prey has to divide its 
capital between “defensive fortifications” (x




d =  x
d + k
d    (1) 
 
The predator moves next and s/he divides his/her initial endowment (e
o) between “offensive 
weapons” (x




o =  x
o + k
o    (2) 
 
The production is a linear function with a coefficient (). In the case of predation (x
o  0), the 
prey preserves a fraction (θ) of her/his endowment. This fraction depends on the relative amount 




/  0. Final wealth is w
j (j = d,o), and since predation destroys resources
12, the final wealth may 
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j. The model’s equilibria are Nash equilibria and they are based on optimal choices of x
o 
and  x
d.  The  various  equilibria  depend  on  relative  initial  endowments  (    =  e
d/  e
o),  and  the 
effectiveness  of  predation  compared  to  defensive  activities  ().  Three  possibilities  can  be 
distinguished.  
 
If  and  are both small (i.e. if both agents are poor and the predatory activity is not so effective) 
then there will be a non-aggressive equilibrium. If  is large, whereas  is neither too large nor 
too small (i.e. if the predator is poorer than the prey), then it will be profitable for the predator to 
allocate its resources entirely to the predatory activity. In this case, we will have pure predation 
equilibrium. If  is too small, then we will be once again in a non-aggressive equilibrium even if 
                                                              
12 Grossman and Kim (1995, pp. 1279-1280; 1996a, p. 60; 1996b, p. 335) allow for the possibility that predation can 
be destructive. By this, they mean that the predator gains less from predation than the prey loses. This destruction or 
damage due to  fighting can be called “collateral damage”. Grossman and Kim measure this “destructiveness of 
predation” by a parameter 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. For example, perhaps the predator’s gain is subject to deterioration during 
shipment, or the predator’s gain needs to be processed to be usable. Specifically, although the prey dynasty loses the 
fraction 1 – Pt of its gross production, the predator dynasty gains only the fraction (1 – β) (1 – Pt) of the prey’s gross 
production. Hence, “predatory activity” should not be confused with “destructive activity” in general. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that because the destructiveness of predation deters predation, the smaller the cost of appropriative 
activities, the more destructive predation would be.  In a non-military context, Becker’s (1983) analysis of pressure 
groups competition shows how incidental damage to the economy (“deadweight loss”) tends to limit the extent of 





































 is large, since the ineffectiveness of offensive weapons will not allow the potential predator to 
allocate its resources to predatory activity. If  is too large (i.e. if the offensive weapons are 
extremely effective), then the potential predator does not need to devote all its effort to predatory 
activity and can carry out both productive and destructive activity. In this last case, we will have 
part-time predation equilibrium (Grossman and Kim, 1996a, pp. 65-70).  
 
Grossman and Kim (1996b) have extended this model to a growing dynamic economy. Inherited 
wealth  can  be  devoted  to  one  of  three  activities:  1)  consumption  of  production  goods;  2) 
accumulation of  productive capital;  and 3)  production of  “offensive  weapons”  or  “defensive 
fortifications”. Growth depends on the amount of accumulation of productive capita, whereas the 
redistribution  of  wealth  from  prey  to  predator  depends  on  the  effectiveness  of  predatory 
activities.  The  destruction  of  the  wealth  would  be  an  outcome  of  devoting  all  resources  to 
defensive and offensive actions. Hence, the growth of an economy can be directly affected by 
predatory or protective activities. Grossman and Kim (1996b) describe protective activities as 
those that guarantee the security of property rights, and thence develop a theory of property rights 
in a growth model. They conclude that the property rights would be secure if the potential prey 
devotes sufficient resources to protective activities so that the predator would be dissuaded to 
engage in offensive activities. Moreover, they argue that since the security of property rights is 
not costless, it may sometimes be more profitable not to guarantee it fully and tolerate a certain 
level  of  predation.  In  fact,  the  authors  show  that  certain  societies  which  tolerate  predation 
sometimes grow more quickly than those that always give priority to the full security of property 
rights.  
 
There is another interesting case relevant to predatory activity which Aristotle notes in Politics. 
Nonetheless, the afore-mentioned models do not discuss it. A country may choose a slow rate of 
growth in order to dissuade other countries from invading it. Aristotle writes: “A nation’s wealth 
is part of its strength; for it is essential that there should be resources sufficient not merely for its 
internal needs but also to meet external dangers. For this purpose the total amount of property 
ought not to be so large that more powerful neighbours will covet it, and the owners be unable to 
repel the invasion; on the other hand, it must not be so small that they cannot finance a war 
against an equal or similar foe. Phaleas of course fixed no limit and there is no denying that 
surplus wealth is very useful. But a limit there should be, and perhaps the best way of stating it 
would be to say that the total wealth should not be so great as to make it profitable for a stronger 
power to go to war attracted by its great size, but only such as might be wanted in a war not 
motivated by the attraction of huge wealth.” (Politics, p. 76)
13.  
 
In this case, the slow rate of growth is not caused by the use of resources in protective activity (as 
it is argued in Grossman and Kim’s model), but is a deliberate choice of a country. In Grossman 
and Kim’s model, this case cannot be discussed independently of the rate of the effectiveness of 
                                                              
13 In the following paragraph, Aristotle examines the costs and benefits of surrounding a city in terms of “offensive 
weapons” and “defensive fortifications”: “For example, when Autophradates was about to lay siege to Atarneus, its 
ruler Eubulus asked him to consider how long it would take him to complete the capture of the city, and then to count 
the cost of a war of that duration. ‘For’, he added, ‘I am willing now to abandon Atarneus in return for a sum of 
money very much less than that.’ These words of Eubulus caused Autopharadates to think again and to abandon the 
siege.” (Politics, p. 76). Undoubtedly, economic calculation is a major aspect of any organized war between two 
nations, tribes, or states. Aristotle also acknowledges the importance of the effectiveness of  “offensive weapons” 





































offensive weapons, since there are two independent variables, namely  = e
d/ e
o (the relative 
initial endowments) and  (the effectiveness of offensive weapons). In other words, even if  is 
small, the type of equilibrium depends on the value of . This result is based upon the assumption 
that  and   are independent. Now, if we assume that  is a function of ,   = F (), and that 
they are positively related to each other, then 
  
 = a + b, where a, b are the parameters and a  0. 
 
This assumption amounts to claiming that greater (lesser) differences in initial endowments (or 
economic  inequalities)  provoke  greater  (lesser)  specialization  in  destructive  activities.  This 
assumption is compatible with many real situations and corresponds to what Hirshleifer (1991b) 
coins as high “decisiveness of conflictual effort”. When decisiveness is low, the rich focus on 
producing a larger social pie of income even though this means that the poor will acquire an 
improved  share.  However,  when  conflictual  superiority  entails  a  considerable  difference  in 
achieved income, for instance when the battle is “winner takes all”, the rich avoid allowing the 
poor  to  win  the  contest  over  distributive  shares.  Accordingly,  high  decisiveness  is  more 
advantageous  to  the  better-endowed  parties,  since  they  can  invest  more  heavily  in  “fighting 
technology” and be in a better position with regard to contest power.  
 
In  fact,  the  rent-seeking  predation  models  can  be  used  to  justify  an  optimal  allocation  of 
resources  to police departments in order  to reduce criminal activity. However, there exists a 
certain level of poverty (and hence a certain critical level of ) for which any protective measure 
cannot dissuade “predatory” activities of poor people against property rights. In other words, I 
suggest  that  there  is  a  critical  value  for    (a  poverty  trap)  for  which  the  predatory  activity 
becomes  inelastic  with  regard  to  the  variation  of  .  This  critical  level  is  not  discussed  in 
predatory models. 
 
Our principal objection to predatory models is that they do not provide any analysis about the 
origin  and  nature  of  predatory  actions.  In  fact,  predatory  actions  can  include  criminal, 
revolutionary, and warlike activities. But these models entirely ignore the distinctions between 
these  various  types  of  predatory  actions  and  assume  that  such  an  action  is  equivalent  to 
plundering (rent-seeking) and necessarily derives from pure economic calculation with regard to 
maximizing the utility function of individual  agents (or dynasties).  
 
Moreover, these models do not inquire into the specific properties of destructive activity and do 
not provide an internal explanation for violence and destruction. As noted earlier, “predatory 
activity” is different from “destructive activity”, even though predation involves destruction, and 
the “destructiveness of predation” is taken into account in Grossman and Kim (1995, 1996a, b) 
by a parameter (β). However, given complete information and the absence of stochastic factors, 
these models do not involve violence and destruction. We should not forget that in these general 
equilibrium models, agents are assumed to be hyper-rational. If they are aware of all states of 
nature (there is no radical uncertainty) and can rationally calculate their costs and benefits in 
different types of aggressive and non aggressive equilibria, then they can anticipate the necessary 






































Grossman  and  Kim  acknowledge  that  “Another  possibility  would  be  that predation  involves 
violence and destruction. But given complete information and the absence of stochastic factors, 
this model does not provide an internal explanation for violence and destruction.” (Grossman and 
Kim, 1995, p. 1279; 1996a, p. 60; 1996b, p. 347). In other words, Predation models as well as 
general equilibrium models of collective rebellions do not treat real destruction or violence, since 
they are based on rational expectation, complete information, and the predictability of all relevant 
states  of  nature.  Hence,  these  models  maintain  the  basic  assumption  of  the  Public  Choice 
approach: rational people will usually not rebel! 
 
Brito and Intriligator (1985) address the question of whether appropriative conflict is resolved 
with  or  without  violence  and  destruction,  and  they  stress  the  importance  of  incomplete 
information  as  a cause  of  violence.  They  distinguish  between  the  threatened use of  force in 
attempting to reallocate resources, which they call “conflict”, and the actual use of weapons, 
which they name “war”. Drawing upon models of bargaining with asymmetric information, they 
introduce two equilibrium concepts, namely separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium. In 
the first type of equilibrium, the uninformed agent attempts to induce the other party (informed 
one) to reveal the pertinent characteristic. In the pooling equilibrium, the uninformed agent does 
not attempt to induce the other party (informed one) to reveal the pertinent characteristic. The 
authors show that if two conflicting countries are both fully informed about the parameters of the 
problem,  there  will  be  no  redistribution  by  actual  war.  Rather,  there  will  be  a  voluntary 
redistribution of resources, with neither side having an incentive to fight.  
 
War can occur, however, in a situation of asymmetric information, where one country is informed 
of  all  the  parameters  of  the  problem,  and  the  other  is  not  informed  about  the  parameter 
characterizing  the  first  country’s  aversion  to  war.  In  such  a  situation,  war  can occur  if  “the 
uninformed country adopts a separating equilibrium strategy, in which it precommits itself to a 
positive probability of war in order to prevent bluffing by the informed country. However, there 
would be no conflict if the uninformed country finds it optimal to adopt a pooling equilibrium 
strategy, in which it does not attempt to prevent such bluffing.” (1985, p. 944). It should be noted 
that this conclusion is not based on a historical or concrete analysis of destruction or violence. 
Neither  the  First  World  War  nor  the  Second  World  War  can  be  explained  on  the  basis  of 
asymmetrical information between belligerent countries. In fact, Brito and Intriligator try to show 
that incomplete information is a sufficient logical condition to justify the rational possibility of 
resorting to destruction or violence. This, however, does not imply that real wars are caused by a 
situation of asymmetric information.  
 
Randomness of political events is another factor which has been raised to explain the genesis of 
collective violence. In Kauffmann’s linear model (2007), short term and event interdependence 
matters. Given that rational people usually do not rebel, stochastic models show that instances of 
rebellion are largely random events (Lichbach, 1992; Blattman and Miguel, 2009). By the same 
token, the modelers could argue that rational people usually do not innovate (since they should 
know everything in advance, the ignorance as well as novelty have no room in their universe), as 
instances  of  innovation  are  largely  random  events.  But,  the  fact  that  revolution  (a  social 
innovation), like any other type of innovation, is a “random” event, does not tell anything about 
its nature, its origin, and its internal logic or “rationality”. Timur Kuran (1989) models the role of 
random events and social psychology in helping to determine the success of insurrections. He 





































the  Russian  Revolution  of  February  1917,  and  the  Iranian  Revolution  of  February  1979. 
Undoubtedly,  socio-political  instability  is  marked by  unpredictability  of  random  events.  And 
incomplete information or even sheer ignorance regarding the outburst of revolution is something 
well known. But these rudimentary truths are not sufficient to provide an internal explanation for 
violence and destruction.          
 
2.3.3 Common property models 
 
There exist two different types of common property models. In the first type of models, agents 
adopt simple strategies. By simple strategies, I mean an optimal constant rate of appropriation of 
the common property (Tornell and Velasco, 1992; Lane and Tornell, 1995, 1996, 1999). In the 
second type of models, agents’ decisions of whether to cooperate or appropriate depend on the 
level of wealth (Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996; Long and Sorger, 2004). This type of models is 
named “common property models with wealth-dependent appropriation” (Drazen, 2000, p. 507). 
 
Growth in common property models with constant rate of appropriation 
 
Lane and Tornell (1996) provide a growth model of common property with a constant rate of 
appropriation. The starting point of this model is that, on average, resource-rich countries do not 
grow  quickly  and  do  not  have  the  highest  incomes  per  capita.  Two  salient  examples  are 
Venezuela and Nigeria. In the former case, the terms of trade grew at an average annual rate of 
13.7 percent over 1970 to 1990 due to sudden increases in oil revenues. However, Venezuela’s 
output per  capita declined  by  28 percent during  the same  period.  In  the  latter  case,  Nigeria 
enjoyed the oil windfall of the 1970s and early 1980s, whereas its GDP per capita over 1970 to 
1990 showed a mediocre annual performance of 0.03 percent. The authors also cite the example 
of Trinidad and Tobago, an oil producer, that grew at only 1.2 percent annually over 1970 to 
1990, and GDP per capita contracted at a rate of -2.75 percent per year over 1980 to 1990.  
 
To explain this paradox, Lane and Tornell extend the neoclassical growth model by replacing the 
representative agent with multiple powerful groups. They define these groups as: “coalitions with 
power to extract transfers from the rest of society. Examples are provincial governments that 
extract transfers from the centre, strong unions and industrial conglomerates that seek protection, 
and patronage networks that obtain  kickbacks from public  works.” (1996, p. 214). Thus,  the 
appropriative activity of powerful groups is described as their power to extract common resources 
for their private consumption.  
 
The “voracity effect” (Lane and Tornell, 1996, 1999) measures the amount of resources that is 
appropriated by these groups following an increase in the rate of return of common resources 
such as oil. Put differently, any increase in the oil revenue in Venezuela, Nigeria, or for Trinidad 
and Tobago where such powerful groups are dominant, provoke a voracity effect: the private 
consumption  of these  groups surpasses  the  amount of increase. The appropriative  activity of 
powerful groups reduces growth rate due to the voracity effect. The model ignores the specific 
institutional matrix of society. Instead, it assumes that society is made up of powerful groups that 







































Lane and Tornell (1996, 1999) assume a “one sector” growth model. In their earlier model (Lane 
and Tornell, 1995), they assumed a second sector that was secure from appropriation by others 
but offered a lower rate of return. Tornell and Velasco (1992) have also studied the effect of a 
second sector with a lower rate of return (an inferior technology, namely saving money in foreign 
bank deposits with lower rate of interest) in order to analyze the capital flow from poor to rich 
countries. They have showed that due to insecurity, economic agents in poor countries prefer to 
deposit their savings in rich countries where the rate of return is inferior compared to their own 
countries  but  is  immune  from  appropriative  activity.  Lane  and  Tornell  (1996)  assume  that 
powerful  groups  do  not  have  access  to  an  additional  private  accumulation.  The  production 
technology is linear with the marginal product of capital being equal to F
’ (K) = α. The aggregate 
output is linear in the aggregate capital stock K(t), and the change in the aggregate capital stock is 
simply the output minus the total sum of the private consumption of powerful groups at each 








where Cj (t) is the private consumption or appropriation of group (j) at time t. 
 
Agents’ preferences are represented by CES functions. The objective function of each group is 




∞ σ/σ-1 Cj (s)
σ-1/σ e
-ρ (s-t) ds 
 
where the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is σ > 0 and where ρ < α. There is an upper 
bound (Ѓ) on the rate of appropriation by each group. Hence 
 
(3)  0 ≤ C
j(t) ≤ ЃK(t), where 0 ≤ [α (1-σ)+ρσ]/[J-σ(J-1)] <Ѓ<∞ 
 
The  output  cannot  be  appropriated  all  at  once.  The  value  [α  (1-σ)+ρσ]/[J-σ(J-1)]  is  the 
appropriation  rate  in  an  interior  equilibrium.  Each  group’s  strategy  is  to  choose  an  optimal 
consumption stream C
j(t) to maximize (2) subject to (3) and the strategies of the other players. 
Lane and Tornell consider Markov strategies, namely strategies that are restricted to be functions 
only  of  the  pay  off  relevant  state  variables  and  are  not  allowed  to  be  history  dependent. 
Subsequently, they define the interior equilibrium as well as extreme equilibria of their model. In 
the  interior  equilibrium,  the  appropriation  rates  of  all  groups  lie  in  the  interior  of  the 
appropriation set.  
 
In  addition  to  this  type  of  equilibrium,  for  some  parameter  values,  there  exist  two  extreme 
Markov  perfect  equilibria.  Having  examined  the  conditions  of  the  stability  of  the  interior 
equilibrium in the presence of multiple equilibria, Lane and Tornell study the “voracity effect”. 
They define the “voracity effect” as follows: “a more than proportional increase in aggregate 
redistribution  in  response  to  an  increase  in  the raw  rate  of  return  (α).”  (1996,  p.  226).  The 
question is then to identify conditions under which the existence of powerful groups leads to a 
perverse  response  to  positive  productivity  or  terms  of  trade  shocks,  in  which  redistribution 
increases and the growth rate falls. Their results can be summarized in the following proposition. 
“Proposition 2: (The Voracity Effect). A positive shock to productivity or to the terms of trade: i) 





































non-cooperatively and σ > n/n-1
14; ii) Leads to an increase in the growth rate if groups have no 
power to extract transfers from the rest of society, or their behaviour is coordinated by a central 
planner.” (1996, p. 227).  
 
In other words, if the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low, powerful groups 
will not appropriate excessively, and the “voracity effect” does not operate. Moreover, Lane and 
Tornell’s  model  confirm  Olson’s  result  (1982,  1993)  that  if  there  exist  only  one  long-lived 
powerful group or a few powerful groups that can coordinate and act cooperatively, then first-
best policies will be implemented, and the outcomes will be those of the representative agent 
model.  The  “voracity  effect”  holds  when  there  are  a  few  powerful  groups  that  cannot  act 
cooperatively and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is high enough, namely: σ>J/J-1.  
 
The authors also construct a dummy variable dubbed as “Power”. Applying this “Power” dummy 
variable, they dichotomize countries into a group that has slow growth and responds negatively to 
terms of trade shocks and a group with relatively higher growth which responds positively to 
terms of trade shocks. Venezuela, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago are part of the first group with a 
high rate of the “voracity effect”. 
 
The “voracity effect” measures the extent of rent-seeking or appropriative activity of organized 
powerful groups. The “powerful groups” are not limited to ruling classes, military elites, or other 
dominant groups. They include workers’ unions, or other types of employees’ pressure groups. If 
in a country there exist strong workers’ and employers’ unions that cannot act cooperatively, the 
“voracity effect” will operate, whereas in the presence of a powerful dictatorial regime (a unique 
long-lived powerful group banning trade unions) the “voracity effect” will not operate.  But it is a 
well known fact that social conflicts usually precede social compromises, and hence workers’ and 
employers’  unions  cannot  achieve  an  acceptable  compromise  without  testing  their  relative 
strength.  
 
It means that a period of social conflict is a necessary historical requisite to achieve a cooperative 
behaviour by both sides of the employment relationship.  Lane  and Tornell’s  model does not 
capture the social and historical advantages of a democratic regime with “two-sided collective 
action”  (according  to  Commons’s  terminology,  1970)  compared  to  a  centralized  dictatorial 
regime. The reason is that the “voracity effect” can operate in such a democratic regime with 
non-cooperative “powerful groups”,  whereas  in a centralized dictatorial  regime, the  “voracity 
effect”  cannot  operate,  since  there  is  no  right  for  trade  unions.  This  result  is  due  to  three 
underlying assumptions in Lane and Tornell’s model.  
 
First, they ignore the specific institutional matrix of the society, and focus only on the role of 
“powerful  groups”.  Thus  the  role  of  “rules”  in  society,  the  type  of  state  and  the  level  of 
development of the civil society are ignored.  
 
Second,  in  defining  the  strategies  of  agents,  they  consider  Markov  strategies  which  are  not 
history  dependent.  Hence,  they  cannot  distinguish  between  different  conflictual  processes 
according to their historical role in developing or hindering a democratic social compromise. This 
lack of distinction between the different types of conflictual processes undermines the clarity of 
                                                              





































the “voracity effect”. The “voracity effect” includes both the appropriative power of pressure 
groups and the necessary social conflict between organized workers’ and employers’ unions in 
order to achieve a “two-sided collective action”.  
 
Third, the competitive market economy with atomized agents (or with a centralized planner or a 
Walrasian crieur de prix) is supposed to be the ideal economy where the “voracity effect” is null. 
Hence,  any  social  conflicts  as  well  as  any  workers’  or employers’  unions  are  regarded  as  a 
deviation from Pareto-optimality. This doctrinal vision of the market economy disregards the 
close relationship between social conflicts, growth and wealth distribution.                 
 
 
Growth in common property models with wealth-dependent appropriation 
 
Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), like Lane and Tornell (1996, 1999), develop a common property 
model. However in their model, the decision of whether to cooperate or appropriate may depend 
on the level of wealth. The starting point of this model is the observation that contrary to the 
prediction of Neoclassical growth theory, poor countries do not grow at faster rates than rich 
countries. In fact, poor countries have usually invested at lower rates, experienced more intense 
social  conflict  and  political  instability,  and  consequently  have  not  grown  faster  than  rich 
countries. Put differently, there is a robust negative correlation between investment and various 
measures  of  political  instability,  and  that  investment-reducing  political  instability  appears  to 
depend on the level of income. The representative agent is replaced by “organized social groups” 
that can capture, or attempt to capture, “a larger share of the output either by means of direct 
appropriation  or  by  manipulating  the  political  system  to  implement  favourable  transfers, 
regulations, and other redistributive policies.” (1996, p. 126). Such appropriative activity can 
provoke significant disincentives to accumulate, and can be stronger at lower than higher levels 
of wealth, so that poorer countries may grow more slowly or even stagnate at lower levels of 
growth (which Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996, p. 126 call “growth trap”). 
 
To capture this relationship between growth and wealth, the authors use a simple dynamic game 
theoretical model. Organized social groups can follow an appropriative strategy, but this type of 
strategy eventually generates retaliation in the future. In other words, defection by one player 
from cooperative behaviour provokes other players to adopt non-cooperative behaviour in the 
future, resulting in a complete exhaustion of the capital stock. Whether high or low levels of 
wealth depress investment and growth rates critically depend on the curvatures of technology and 
preferences. Both cases are possible. Lower wealth may lead to lower growth and sometimes, to a 
“growth trap”. This case is more likely when there are sufficiently high diminishing returns in 
utility, since  when wealth and consumption are  high,  the utility  value of appropriating  more 
consumption in the present is less attractive, than the cost of retaliation in the future.  
 
With the same token, the opposite may also be true at lower levels of wealth, when consumption 
is low and marginal utility is high. The utility value of appropriating more consumption in the 
present outweighs the cost of future retaliation. Conversely, if the marginal utility of consumption 
does  not  diminish  significantly  as  consumption  rises,  compared  to  the  decreasing  marginal 
productivity of capital, the opposite will be true. At low levels, capital is too valuable to risk the 
retaliation. As capital becomes more abundant, fully cooperative behaviour cannot be guaranteed, 





































idea that in a mature rich economy (like England), there may exist inefficiencies due to organized 
groups exerting redistributive pressures.  
 
Unlike the Lane and Tornell (1996) model, in which there is an exogenous upper bound on the 
rate of appropriation
15, the only limit on appropriation is the total level of resources. Since there 
is  no  exogenously  upper  bound  on  appropriation,  total  consumption of  the  two  players  may 
exceed  available output,  so  an  allocation  rule  must  be  specified.  This  rule has  to  relate  the 
consumption of the two players (c1and c2) to the amount of output allocated to them (f(k)). For 
instance, for the first player, the authors specify the following rule: 
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and a similar allocation rule for A2(.) for the second player. Then, one possibility is that each 
player tries to appropriate as much as s/he can. In this case, all output is consumed in one period. 
More formally, Benhabib and Rustichini consider the pair of “fast consumption strategies” (1996, 
p. 128) ĉ1(k) = ĉ2(k) = f (k). This will be a subgame-perfect equilibrium, and the value to player 
(j) of this equilibrium is  
 
(2)  Vj
D (k0) = ∑t=0
∞ ß
t u (Aj[ĉ1 (kt), ĉ2 (k2), k2]) = u[f(k0/2)] 
 
Where ß is the discount factor and u(.) is the instantaneous utility function for both players. 
 
Fast consumption strategies are important, since they are the punishment after a defection from a 
cooperative equilibrium. In other words, if one group adopts a non-cooperative strategy, others 
will also stop playing cooperatively and try to appropriate as much as they can. Hence they will 
be induced to adopt a fast consumption strategy. Equation (2) defines the threat level in this 





t u (cj(t)) ≥ Vj
D (k0), 
 
where cj(t) is the level of consumption in the equilibrium. Benhabib and Rustichini consider two 
other  equilibrium concepts, namely  a  first-best equilibrium  and  a  second-best  equilibrium  in 
order  to derive possible growth paths  and from that, the possibilities  for  welfare-maximizing 
growth (1996, pp. 129-133).  
 
They subsequently discuss wealth-dependent strategies, and show that the possibility of enforcing 
a  first-best  equilibrium  may  depend  on  the  level  of  wealth.  One  possibility,  consistent  with 
“poverty traps” is that first-best behaviour, and hence first-best growth rates are sustainable from 
high levels of wealth, but not from low levels, because of the incentive compatibility constraints. 
Their  intuition  is  that  when  stocks  of  capital  are  low,  it  is  not  possible  to  increase  the 
                                                              
15 Lane and Tornell (1996) also consider a lower bound on appropriation, but as Drazen (2000, p. 503) rightly argues, 





































consumption  enough  to  avoid  defection.  The  alternative  wealth-dependent  case  is  where 
cooperative behaviour is sustainable from low levels of (k), but not from high levels. Benhabib 
and Rustichini call this possibility “an ‘Olson’ case” (1996, pp. 137-139). This case alludes to 
“mature” societies (societies with high levels of income, like England in Olson’s 1982 example) 
which suffer from a low level of growth rate due to the appropriative activity of powerful interest 
groups. 
 
By  focusing  on  second-best  sub-game  perfect  equilibria,  the  authors’  contribution  is  in 
illustrating  that  growth  rates  can  indeed  be  wealth  dependent.  Poor  countries  may  indeed 
accumulate at lower rates because even for the best sustainable equilibria,  the incentives for 
appropriation can be much stronger at low levels of wealth than at high levels, and thus the 
momentary advantages of defection can be overcome only with high consumption and low level 
investment rates. The model elegantly explains the relationship between appropriative strategies 
and different levels of wealth. However, the authors, like Lane and Tornell, ignore the specific 
institutional matrix of society, and focus only on the role of “organized social groups”. Thus the 
role of “rules” in society, the type of state and the level of development of the civil society are 
ignored. In Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), “organized social groups” are defined in the same 
way  as  “powerful  groups”  in  Lane  and  Tornell  (1996,  1999).  Labour  unions  as  well  as 
employers’ unions are considered to be part of “organized social groups”. The model assumes 
that “suppression of interest groups under authoritarian regimes may have increased the cost of 
defection and appropriation, making way for first-best growth.” (1996, p. 141). Two examples 
are given: Korea and Chile.  
 
Undoubtedly,  Pinochet’s  coup  d’état  and  the  overthrow  of  Allende’s  government  led  to  the 
suppression of all kinds of non governmental associations as well as independent labour unions. 
In this sense, Pinochet’s authoritarian regime suppressed some “interest groups” and according to 
the  authors,  in  doing  so,  he  contributed  to  Chilean  economic  growth.  In  fact,  the  authors’ 
fundamental assumption is that poorer countries are more prone to political instability. Therefore, 
an authoritarian regime that provides political stability may be beneficial to economic growth in 
poorer countries. But once the country becomes richer and the increased rate of growth becomes 
sustainable, then the authoritarian government will no longer be necessary. Applying this recipe 
to  Korea  and  Chile,  the  authors  contend:  “Later,  once  the  original  switching  threshold  was 
crossed, first-best growth may have become self-sustaining and the authoritarian regimes toppled, 
as they no longer were necessary to sustain growth. A more recent example, following the path of 
Chile, may be Peru.” (1996, p. 141, underlined by me). Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) show this 
“switching threshold” in their Figure 2 (p. 136), and argue that only after the threshold wealth 
level of (k1) has been reached does growth resume its higher first-best level. There is an implicit 
political  pattern  in  their  model  for  “poorer  countries”:  first,  economic  growth  under  an 
authoritarian regime; then political democracy. Hence, we first need a Pinochet to establish a 
“free” market economy, then we can have our “free” parliamentary democracy
16!  
 
                                                              
16  The  same  type  of  argument  has  been  advanced  to  justify  the  use  of  « an  iron  hand »  in  China  during  the 
Tiananmen’s  events  in  spring  1989.  According  to  this  kind  of  political  philosophy,  the  new  Chinese  market 
economy, like the Chilean economy, apparently needs an authoritarian regime (Pinochet’s type of government) in the 





































But, what guarantees that once the threshold wealth level of (k1)  has been reached, political 
instability will not be unleashed? In fact, there are many examples that show political instability 
following a certain level of growth in developing countries. The Iranian February revolution in 
1979 followed a long period of growth rate since the agrarian reform in 1963 and six years after 
the first petrol shock in 1973. In other words, there is no linear relationship between political 
instability  and  growth.  As  Huntington  (1968)  highlights  when  poor  or  developing  countries 
experience  a  “period  of  takeoff”  and  rapid  growth,  social  and  political  unrest  may  actually 
increase. Not only new demands are generated, and the process of urbanization accelerates, but 
also  the  need  to  change  archaic  institutions  and  to  build  new  ones  to  cope  with  social  and 
economic transformation become pressing.  
 
Developed countries, unlike developing ones, already have some basic institutions to deal with 
social and economic transformations, although even in these countries, socio-political instability 
is not excluded in certain situations such as May 1968 in France
17 or the United States during the 
Vietnam War. In developing countries, this institutional change is frequently accompanied by 
social turmoil and political revolutions. Huntington defines “revolution” in such countries as part 
of the “modernization” process: “Revolution is…an aspect of modernization…(I)t is most likely 
to occur in societies which have experienced some social and economic development and where 
the process of political modernization and political development have lagged behind the process 
of social and economic change.” (1968, p. 265).  
 
While I agree with Huntington’s analysis regarding revolution as an aspect of modernization in 
developing  countries,  it  seems  to  me  that  he  does  not  sufficiently  take  into  account  the 
importance of the international system. As Theda Skocpol (1979) rightly pinpoints not only class 
competition and conflict, but also nation-state rivalry, competition, and war play a crucial role in 
the genesis of revolutions. The machinations of foreign states have played a decisive part in the 
history  of  the  world’s poor  countries,  most of  which  are small  and  weak.  Moreover,  it  was 
colonialism that set the stage for many contemporary revolutions. Given the course of World War 
II, it is not surprising that in its aftermath there was social upheaval in Korea, China, Vietnam, 
and Burma. And if Churchill had remained in power, India too, would likely have been torn by 
even more political turmoil, with democracy being an unlikely outcome. In Africa, the reluctance 
of the French to leave Algeria contributed to that country’s radicalization, a lesson ignored by the 
Portuguese  in  Guinea-Bissau,  Mozambique,  and  Angola.  In  these  cases  and  others,  Skocpol 
perspicaciously intimates that the roots of revolutions should be sought in the “specific inter-
relations  of  class  and  state  structures  and  the  complex  interplay  over  time  of  domestic  and 
international developments.” (1979, p. xiii).   
 
Contrary to more abstract and axiomatic approaches to revolution and political instability, the 
case-study  method  of  Skocpol  has  the  particular  merit  of  insisting  on  specific  historical 
circumstances. In this perspective, the long-term outcome of revolution is not just a progression 
to a more “efficient” economy and the political ascension of a formerly subordinate class. As 
Collburn asserts, as a result of revolution, “the state itself comes to have growing power and 
autonomy.” (1994, p. 12). The recognition of the autonomy of politics with regard to economics 
                                                              
17 It is noteworthy that the political events in May 1968 in France also occurred at the end of a protracted period of 
economic growth following the Second World War, with a 5.5 percent average annual rate of growth. These “thirty 





































implies that there is no linear relationship between economic growth and political instability. 
Regrettably, the  model of Benhabib and Rustichini  (1996), like  all other  models inspired by 
Public Choice approach, is based on economic determinism. This means that all institutional and 
political change is directly associated with economic change and the autonomy of political and 
institutional evolution is denied. In fact, “economic imperialism” involves a linear relationship 
between political instability and economic growth: poor countries with low rates of growth are 
prone to instability, whereas rich countries with high rates of growth are marked by political 
stability. However, such a linear relationship cannot capture the independent role of destructive 





The main finding of this paper is that both strands of recent economic literature, namely the 
Strategic Conflict theory and Public Choice have not yet come to grips with social conflicts. The 
application of standard  microeconomic assumptions  to the field of “social  conflicts” and the 
extension of Coasian theorem to coercive power have resulted in reducing conflicts either to 
“rational  conflicts”-a  threat of  conflict  without any  real clash-or “real  self-interested private 
conflicts”. In other words, economic theory has considered social protesters either as (potential or 
actual) looters or as lunatics (irrational), but never as a group of people struggling for a common 
cause. 
 
Generally speaking,  the two theories provide no  internal explanation for real destruction  and 
violence. In rare cases where an explanation of “violence and real destruction” is suggested, it is 
reduced to asymmetric information or random events. The “unpredictable” character of social 
destructive behaviour is a rudimentary truth, and a reference to “randomness” of political events 
is very far from any serious analysis of the phenomenon. Asymmetric information is perhaps a 
logical explanation for the emergence of violence and real destruction, but it cannot be a great 
help to grasp the nature of major wars such as the two World Wars. In fact, conflict theory and 
political  instability  models  have  not  overcome  the  limits  of  the  mainstream  economics  to 
reconcile “social conflicts” with the ubiquitous market model and the assumption of privately 
interested individual agents. 
 
Moreover,  these  models  do  not  distinguish  between  different  types  of  collective  rebellion, 
criminal activity and warlike activities. They are all regarded as “predatory”, “appropriative”, or 
“rent-seeking” activities. This is due to the fact that all these models ignore the institutional set-
up of the societies, and the strategies of the agents are supposed to be rational but not history 
dependent.  
 
Finally, these models are based upon economic determinism, namely the denial of autonomy for 
the political sphere with regard to economic activity.  
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